The purpose of this paper is to describe recent special attention to the regulation of banks and other financial innovation in the United States, outline its depository institutions. Section II describes the principal implications with regard to (1) the structure forces that appear to underlie the accelerated rate of and behavior of financial markets and (2) the conduct financial innovation in recent years. Sections III and of monetary policy, and speculate on the likely char-IV discuss the impact of this innovation on financial acter of further innovation in the near-term future.
markets and the conduct of monetary policy, respecIn the United States as elsewhere, financial innovatively. Finally, Section V speculates briefly on tion has been a continuous but uneven process, where future prospects. In view of the breadth of the topic the rate of innovation has varied substantially from and the purpose of the symposium for which this one period to the next depending on a variety of paper was prepared, the paper will seek to synthesize circumstances. In particular, there have been a available information on recent financial innovation number of periods of accelerated innovation in U. S.
in the United States rather than to break new anafinancial history, frequently during or following lytical ground. periods of great social and political upheaval such as the Civil \\Tar and the Great Depression. It seems I clear in retrospect that the 1970s and early 1980s .
have been years of relatively rapid innovation due BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE largely to (1) higher inflation and its impact on AND REGULATION OF U. S. FINANCIAL MARKETS interest rates and (2) rapid technological progress that has significantly reduced the real costs of carryThis section provides background information on ing out financial transactions. This accelerated innothe general structure of U. S. financial markets and vat ion has already had a profound effect on the the regulation of these markets. This perspective is competitive structure and risk characteristics of essential to an understanding of the nauIre of recent American banking and financial markets, on the way financial innovation and the forces underlying it.
these markets are regulated, and on the conduct of U. S. monetary policy. Further, while there is some A. Structure of U. S. Financial Markets reason to believe that the pace of innovation may As is well known, the money and capital markets diminish in the United States in the years immediin the United States are among the largest and most ately ahead, the full impact of the innovations that highly developed in the world. Tables I and II  have already occurred probably has not yet been felt.
provide a general idea of the size, scope and structure
The paper is organized as follo,vs.l Section I proof these markets. Table I is a flow of funds table vides background information on the structure and that shows total net ne\v demands for and supplies regulation of American financial markets, ,vith of funds in U. S. credit markets in recent years in both dollar and percentage terms. In addition, the *This paper ,vas delivered at the First International final column on the right side of the Kaufman, McKeon and Blitz (1984) , Table 3C , p. 33. Passbook savings deposits subject to a ceiling rate firms and households. As an example, Sears, Roeaccounted for most of the remainder. By 1975, just buck and Company, the country's largest retail chain, prior to the accelerated deregulation of the late 1970s, has recently acquired a large investment bank and a the demand deposit share had declined to 19.7 perlarge real estate finance company and linked these cent. By 1983, the share had dropped further to 10.5 operations to its existing insurance, credit card and percent, and the Regulation Q ceilings had been other financial services. By offering these services lifted on all time deposits with the exception of passthrough its vast chain of retail stores, Sears can reach book savings accounts. Of particular importance in virtually every geographic market in the United the current situation, the category of "other checkStates. Merrill Lynch, American Express, and other able deposits" (column 3 in the table), which inlarge companies are rapidly building similar financial cludes ordinary NOW accounts, Super NOWs and service conglomerates. other interest-bearing transactions accounts, has
Although it is difficult to quantify the degree of been rising rapidly since 1980, while the demand this competition in the aggregate, some idea of the deposit category has been declining. This trend order of magnitude is conveyed by diverse statistics. will almost certainly continue in the years ahead.
At the end of 1981, the financial service subsidiaries The changes manifested in Table IV have obvious of three large manufacturing companies (General implications for U. S. depository institutions. First, Electric, Ford, and General Motors) held $45.8 bilalthough in the past banks and other depositories lion of consumer installment credit compared to the paid implicit interest in a variety of forms on demand $27.7 billion held worldwide by Citicorp, the Bank deposits and other liabilities that did not yield exof America and Chase Manhattan. At the end of the plicit interest, there can be little doubt that deregusame year, total business lending (commercial and lation has raised the average cost of funds for many industrial loans, commercial mortgage loans, and of these institutions, especially in recent years. This lease financing) by 32 nonbank companies was increase has forced the adoption of more systematic slightly over $100 billion, one-third of the total outand explicit pricing policies for loans and other serstanding at the 15 largest bank holding companies.21 vices and has probably reduced cross-subsidization
In their effort to compete still more directly with across various categories of customers. Second, the banks and other depositories, a number of nonbank trend toward explicit interest has increased short-run financial service providers have acquired commercial variations in the cost of funds. This has made it banks in recent years. In order to avoid being classinecessary for depository institutions, like other finanfied legally as bank holding companies and therefore cial and nonfinancial firms, to "manage" interest subjected to banking regulation, the acquiring comrate risk to a much greater extent than formerly, by panies have then taken advantage of a provision in either shortening loan maturities, making loan rates the current bank holding company law that defines a variable, or hedging the risk in futures markets.
bank as an institution that both (1) offers demand deposits and (2) makes commercial loans. After the 4. The Present Situation: Further Increases in elimination of one of these two activities from the C01HPetition from Nondepository Institutions, Conacquired bank's operations, the bank is no longer a solidation in the Supply of Financial Ser1!ices, and bank in the eyes of the law, and the acquiring comthe Denlise of Geographic Restrictions While pany is not a bank holding company. These affiliates, changes in the level and variability of the cost of thus transformed, have earned the awkward designafunds have had important effects on depository instition "nonbank banks." Since nonbank banks are not tutions in recent years, the increased competition banks, they are not subject to the remaining restricfrom nondepository institutions has been equally tions on banks, notably geographic branching restricsignificant. In addition to the competition from tions. Therefore, there is no legal barrier to prevent a MMMFs, there have been several mergers involving nonbank financial service provider from establishing a large investment banks and insurance companies, and national network of nonbank banks, which enorsome of the largest nonfinancial companies in the mously increases the deposit base on which the comnation have recently added an array of additional pany can draw. In the view of many observers, nonfinancial service activities to their existing installbank banks constitute a rather blatant circumvention ment credit operations. The purpose of these conof the Glass-Steagall Act, and they were the subject solidations is the creation of financial service con- it, a number of states in particular regions are presbut the issue is almost certain to surface again ill ently establishing or attempting to establish reciprocal 1985.
regional interstate banking agreements. These agreeThe trend toward consolidation in the supply of ments would permit bank holding companies based in financial services has not been restricted to nonbank the region to operate banks in any state in the and nondepository companies, Both banks and bank region but would preclude entry by banks based holding companies have sought to enter a variety of outside the region.25 In the absence of specific legisnonbanking industries throughout the postwar perilation halting these various developments, an accelerod, and their efforts have intensified in recent years.22 ation of the growth of interstate banking activities Although Congress does not appear to be prepared appears likely in the years immediately ahead, to repeal the main provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, an omnibus bill passed by the Senate in the 5, Suntmary The powerful innovative forces summer of 1984 would have permitted bank holding unleashed by rising. inflation and adva~ci~g techcompanies to underwrite municipal revenue bonds nology have substantially eroded the restrIctIve bank and engage in several other previously proscribed regulato:y struct~re th~t emerged from the. G~eat activities. In addition, the Federal Reserve has apDepressIon, ThIs erosIon has had three prIncIpal proved the acquisition of discount brokerage comeffects, First, the structure of bank funds, the averpanies (which trade but do not underwrite securities) age cost of these funds, and the stability of the cost by bank holding companies, and this action has been of funds have all changed dramatically since 1960. upheld in the federal courts.23
These changes have greatly altered the character of Apart from their efforts to expand into nonbankbanking operations in the. United St~tes. Second, ing acti~'ities, the larger bank holding companies are although the legal separatIon of bankIng and other presently strengthening their effort to dismantle, de lines of commer~e rem~ins in force, the actual bo~n.dfacto if not de jure, the remaining restrictions on ary has beco~e ~nc~easmgly blurred d~e ~o the a~llIty geographic expansion. United States. They would therefore be able to establish prospects. domestic operations in many of these activities rather quickly if the restrictions were lifted. some extent rom tel ICU ties current y p agumg the thrift industry as a result of the secular rise in The evolution of U. S. monetary policy in the interest rates. On balance, these innovations appear postwar period has been a long and rather diffuse to have benefited both the residential construction process. Although there has always been some attenindustry and home buyers, since the recovery of the tion to monetary conditions-as opposed to credit homebuilding sector of the economy following the conditions-and the behavior of monetary aggregates, 1981-1982 recession was strong. There is presently it is probably accurate to say that most of the emphaconsiderable concern, however, that the existence of a sis in the actual conduct of policy in the 1950s and large stock of variable rate mortgage debt will in1960s was on the effect of the Federal Reserve's crease the incidence of default if and when interest policy actions on the availability and cost of credit in rates come under renewed upward pressure.
short-term credit markets.
. Farr and Porter (1983 ). and 1980 -1981 , M1 grew unusually rapidly in rela-33 See Judd (1983 . See also Broaddus and Goodfriend tion to nominal GNP in the 1982 -1983 period. This (1984 which includes a so-called "ratchet" variable designed As noted in the discussion of prospects for moneto capture the impact of cash management innovations tary policy in the next section of this article, the Fed induced by the successively higher interest rate peaks has come under pressure from several quarters rein the 1970s and early 1980s.35 Although inclusion of cently to drop its money supply targets in favor of this variable does not eliminate the overprediction of one of several alternative strategies. To date the money demand shown in Table V ponents with no attention given in the aggregation PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS38 process to differences in the monetary services provided by the components. For example, Ml as it is To this point this article has dealt with the past currently defined includes (1) currency and demand and the present. This section will look to the future deposits, which pay no explicit interest but provide a and speculate on how the lingering effects of the wide range of transactions services, and (2) h .. h h h th th t times un appy expenence as taug t t e au or a some savln?s. ~ervlces-I.~., store of value ser"cesforecasting is the most dangerous of all the profesas well. Dtvlsla aggregation takes account of these sional activities economists engage in. Accordingly, differences by assigning different weights to the comthe speculative comments that follow will focus priponents of an aggregate in constructing the aggre-o' marily on the relatively near-term future through the gate. To be specific, the weight attached to each remainder of the 1980s. component is determined by the spread between the market yield paid on a nonmonetary asset such as A. Prospects for the Financial Markets and commercial paper and the explicit own yield paid on the Provision of Financial Services the component in question. This spread is the opporAs noted above, American financial institutionstunity cost of holding the component (in terms of especially commercial banks and thrift institutionsexplicit interest foregone) and is assumed to be a have come under severe pressure in recent years due reasonable proxy for the rental cost of the monetary to rising competition from external sources, the imservices pro,'ided by the component and therefore for pact of deregulation on the cost of funding, the apparthe flow of services themselves. In this way, the ent deterioration in the quality of some bank loan highest weights are assigned to assets like currency portfolios, and the increased incidence of bank fail- arena an among regu atory agencIes, e pace 0 Although Dtvlsla aggregation would appear to be deregulation slowed in 1984, and it may well remain superior in principle to conventional simple-sum lower in the near-term future. aggregation, empirical results using these aggregates
The forces driving the longer run process of innohave been mixed.
In recent dynamic simulations vation and deregulation, however, are still very much using two money demand specifications,37 the Divisia alive, and the process is therefore likely to continue aggregates generally outperformed their conventional in the absence of a major financial catastrophe. counterparts in the case of the broader aggregates, Several developments seem probable in the years but they yielded inferior results in the case of the immediately ahead. First, one of the measures availnarrower aggregates such as MI.
For this reason, able to deal with the current weakness of some thrift and in view of the obvious difficulties the Fed would institutions and the associated risk is a more lenient encounter in communicating its objectives to the stance by the regulators toward acquisitions of thrifts public if it were to substitute the Divisia aggregates bv bank holding companies. Such consolidations for the standard aggregates in setting its monetary \\:ould further blur the distinctions between various targets, it is unlikely that the Di,'isia measures will categories of depository institutions. Second, the playa major operational role in the actual implebreakdown of the barriers to interstate banking is mentation of policy in the foreseeable future. Conalmost certain to continue. At the moment, it appears tinued research with these measures, however, and that the next stage of this process will take the form inforl11al monitoring of their behavior may help the of regional agreements that exclude the money center Fed avoid being misled by temporarily aberrant bebanks, but the latter can be expected to press hard havior of the conventional aggregates due to innovation and deregulation.. for equitable access to these markets, and it is possiat the federal level. The most recent formal recomble they will receive judicial relief under the antimendations were announced in early 1984 by the trust laws; Finally, the line of separation between Task Group on Regulation of Financial Institutions (1) banking and (2) other financial and nonfinancial chaired by Vice President Bush.3D Among other activities is likely to be eroded further as banks and things, these recommendations called for simplifying nonbank institutions both seek to expand further the structure at the federal level by assigning the into the other group's territory.
In particular, there responsibility for regulating and supervising all but is a fairly high probability that legislation will be the largest banking organizations to a new agency passed in the relatively near future allowing banks to built around the present Office of the Comptroller underwrite municipal revenue bonds and perhaps of the Currency. Responsibility for the 1argest orsecurities backed by mortgage pools, since the poganizations would be vested in the Federal Reserve. tential for abuse seems minimal in these areas.
If past experience is any guide, resistance by the The examples just given relate to near-term prosaffected agencies and their constituencies will prepects and are relatively narrow in scope. The larger vent the early adoption of these recommendations. and more important issue is: What will the structure Regarding the deposit insurance system, the failure of U. S. banking and financial markets look like in of the Continental Illinois Bank and the events lead-1990? Will there be significant further erosion of ing up to that failure have brought earlier recomproduct-line barriers so that banks and other commendations for reform of the system to the attention panies meld into "department stores" of finance?
of both the Congress and the public.4O Many of these Will small banks and other small financial institutions recommendations are for changes that would reduce be swallowed up by larger institutions? It is imposthe danger that the existence of deposit insurance sible to do more than guess at the answers to these might tempt banks to take risks they would otherwise questions. Some further consolidation across product avoid. Examples of the suggested changes are reduclines may occur. But many of the conflicts of interest tions in the coverage of time deposits, permitting and other risks that the Glass-Steagall Act attempted private insurance companies to compete with governto prevent are still perceived to be real dangers, so ment agencies in providing insurance, and permitting it is unlikely that the basic legal barrier bet\veen graduated premiums that reflect the relative risk of banking and commerce will be dismantled in the failure of individual institutions. Despite their logical foreseeable future. Perhaps more fundamentally, the appeal, these recommendations raise a number of microeconomics of such consolidations is not well questions. What criteria, for example, would be understood at present.
Specifically, the extent of used to determine relative risk in administering gradjoint economies in the production and consumption of uated premiums? These kinds of questions plus the diverse financial services is not known.
In these broad public support for the present insurance system circumstances, it seems likely that a substantial demake it unlikely that wholesale changes will be forthgree of specialization in the provision of financial coming at an early date unless further disruptions in services will persist even if a further dismantling of banking markets force them. the regulatory barriers occurs. In a similar way, since there is no clear evidence of significant econo-B. but it is only a relatively narrow aspect of the broader of the IS curve-targeting interest rates will yield a public debate about monetary policy that is currently better policy performance than targeting the money going on in the United States. The experience in supply. Against this background, some economists recent years of historically high peace-time inflation, have concluded that innovation has in fact reduced high and extremely volatile interest rates, two severe the predictability of the money-GNP relationship to and protracted recessions, and \\'ide swings in the such an extent that targeting money supply gro\\,th is value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets has no longer appropriate, at least as long as significant produced demands from some quarters for farinnovation and deregulation are occurring.
Several reaching changes in the strategy of monetary policy alternative targets have been suggested including and in the responsibilities and authority of the Fednominal GNP and real interest rates.
eral Reserve. In particular, a small but vocal group Others, however, favor retention of the present is pressing for a return to the gold standard or some strategy at least for the present. They point out that alternative commodity standard. the instability that has been observed in recent )'ears Although another sharp rise in interest rates or has resulted from (1) concerted efforts in the 1970s inflation or another recession might motivate the to circumvent regulations in the face of high inflation Congress to require fundamental changes in the conand high interest rates and (2) the disruptions caused duct of monetary policy, the more likely outcome over by subsequent deregulation. With the deregulation the remainder of the 1980s is continuation of the process now well advanced, future innovation may be present monetary aggregates strategy coupled with more gradual and more predictable. Further, while an effort to change the institutional regime in which inno\'ation and deregulation may have temporarily the strategy is pursued in ways that will make it affected the relationship between the conventional more likely to succeed. Some of these changes are measures of money such as M1 and the economy, already in place. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 they have not necessarily destabilized the monetary extended Federal Reserve reserve requirements to all sector in any fundamental way. Therefore, targeting depository institutions,42 which reduces variations in the monetary base or some other measure of highthe aggregate required reserve ratio due to shifts powered money might still be feasible even if empiriof deposits across classes of institutions. Further, a cal problems with other monetary aggregates perchange in the reserve accounting mechanism in sisted.
early 1984 from a lagged system to a (nearly) A related issue that has received attention recently contemporaneous system has made it feasible for the concerns the feasibility of monetary control if reFed to change its procedure for controlling the monemaining interest rate ceilings are removed. A control tary aggregates from one that operates through procedure the Fed has used frequently in the past changes in short-term interest rates to one that operinvolves the direct or indirect manipulation of shortates through the supply of total reserves.43 It should term interest rates in order to affect the opportunity be emphasized, however, that although the current cost of holding money balances and therefore the strategy of U. S. policy is formally one of controlling demand for money. It is sometimes argued that with monetary aggregates, there is considerable room interest rate ceilings remo\'ed, yields on the comwithin this strategy for discretionary changes in 1he ponents of the money supply will vary with market emphasis actually given to monetary contr~l-interest rates, thereby reducing the elasticity of especially short-run monetary control-as agaInst money demand with respect to interest rates and other objectives such as stabilizing interest rates ill increasing the change in interest rates required to particular time periods.
Because it regards such produce any desired change in the growth of money. flexibility as desirable, the Fed is likely ~o resist Even in a completely deregulated environment, howcommitting itself to a monetary control regIme th:lt ever, explicit yields on assets providing significant monetary services are likely to vary less than market 42 The requirements had previously been applied only t( Y 'ields Therefore the interest elasticity of money the minority of commercial banks that were members 0:
., . 
